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crates/openfang-skills/bundled/oauth-expert/SKILL.md
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crates/openfang-skills/bundled/oauth-expert/SKILL.md
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---
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name: oauth-expert
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description: "OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect expert for authorization flows, PKCE, and token management"
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---
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# OAuth and OpenID Connect Expert
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An identity and access management specialist with deep expertise in OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, and token-based authentication architectures. This skill provides guidance for implementing secure authorization flows, token lifecycle management, and identity federation patterns across web applications, mobile apps, SPAs, and machine-to-machine services.
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## Key Principles
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- Always use the Authorization Code flow with PKCE for public clients (SPAs, mobile apps, CLI tools); the implicit flow is deprecated and insecure
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- Validate every JWT thoroughly: check the signature algorithm, issuer (iss), audience (aud), expiration (exp), and not-before (nbf) claims before trusting its contents
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- Design scopes to represent specific permissions (read:documents, write:orders) rather than broad roles; fine-grained scopes enable least-privilege access
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- Store tokens securely: HTTP-only secure cookies for web apps, secure storage APIs for mobile, and encrypted credential stores for server-side services
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- Treat refresh tokens as highly sensitive credentials; bind them to the client, rotate on use, and set reasonable absolute expiration times
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## Techniques
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- Implement Authorization Code + PKCE: generate a random code_verifier, derive code_challenge via S256, send the challenge in the authorize request, and send the verifier in the token exchange
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- Use Client Credentials flow for server-to-server authentication where no user context is needed; scope the resulting token narrowly
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- Configure token refresh with sliding window expiration: issue short-lived access tokens (5-15 minutes) with longer refresh tokens (hours to days), rotating the refresh token on each use
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- Implement OIDC by requesting the openid scope; validate the id_token signature and claims, then use the userinfo endpoint for additional profile data
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- Set up the Backend-for-Frontend (BFF) pattern for SPAs: the BFF server handles the OAuth flow and stores tokens in HTTP-only cookies, keeping tokens out of JavaScript entirely
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- Implement token revocation by calling the revocation endpoint on logout and maintaining a server-side deny list for JWTs that must be invalidated before expiration
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## Common Patterns
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- **Multi-tenant Identity**: Use the issuer and tenant claims to route token validation to the correct identity provider, supporting customers who bring their own IdP
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- **Step-up Authentication**: Request additional authentication factors (MFA) when accessing sensitive operations by checking the acr claim and initiating a new auth flow if insufficient
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- **Token Exchange**: Use the OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) for service-to-service delegation, allowing a backend to obtain a narrowly-scoped token on behalf of the original user
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- **Device Authorization Flow**: For input-constrained devices (TVs, CLI tools), use the device code grant where the user authorizes on a separate device with a browser
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## Pitfalls to Avoid
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- Do not store access tokens or refresh tokens in localStorage; they are vulnerable to XSS attacks and accessible to any JavaScript on the page
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- Do not skip the state parameter in authorization requests; it prevents CSRF attacks by binding the request to the user session
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- Do not accept tokens without validating the audience claim; a token issued for one API should not be accepted by a different API
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- Do not implement custom cryptographic token formats; use well-tested JWT libraries and standard OAuth/OIDC specifications
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