refactor: 清理未使用代码并添加未来功能标记

style: 统一代码格式和注释风格

docs: 更新多个功能文档的完整度和状态

feat(runtime): 添加路径验证工具支持

fix(pipeline): 改进条件判断和变量解析逻辑

test(types): 为ID类型添加全面测试用例

chore: 更新依赖项和Cargo.lock文件

perf(mcp): 优化MCP协议传输和错误处理

crates/zclaw-runtime/src/tool/builtin.rs

@@ -5,12 +5,14 @@ mod file_write;
 mod shell_exec;
 mod web_fetch;
 mod execute_skill;
+mod path_validator;
 
 pub use file_read::FileReadTool;
 pub use file_write::FileWriteTool;
 pub use shell_exec::ShellExecTool;
 pub use web_fetch::WebFetchTool;
 pub use execute_skill::ExecuteSkillTool;
+pub use path_validator::{PathValidator, PathValidatorConfig};
 
 use crate::tool::ToolRegistry;
 

crates/zclaw-runtime/src/tool/builtin/file_read.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
-//! File read tool
+//! File read tool with path validation
 
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use zclaw_types::{Result, ZclawError};
+use std::fs;
+use std::io::Read;
 
 use crate::tool::{Tool, ToolContext};
+use super::path_validator::PathValidator;
 
 pub struct FileReadTool;
 
@@ -21,7 +24,7 @@ impl Tool for FileReadTool {
     }
 
     fn description(&self) -> &str {
-        "Read the contents of a file from the filesystem"
+        "Read the contents of a file from the filesystem. The file must be within allowed paths."
     }
 
     fn input_schema(&self) -> Value {
@@ -31,20 +34,78 @@ impl Tool for FileReadTool {
                 "path": {
                     "type": "string",
                     "description": "The path to the file to read"
+                },
+                "encoding": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Text encoding to use (default: utf-8)",
+                    "enum": ["utf-8", "ascii", "binary"]
                 }
             },
             "required": ["path"]
         })
     }
 
-    async fn execute(&self, input: Value, _context: &ToolContext) -> Result<Value> {
+    async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<Value> {
         let path = input["path"].as_str()
             .ok_or_else(|| ZclawError::InvalidInput("Missing 'path' parameter".into()))?;
 
-        // TODO: Implement actual file reading with path validation
-        Ok(json!({
-            "content": format!("File content placeholder for: {}", path)
-        }))
+        let encoding = input["encoding"].as_str().unwrap_or("utf-8");
+
+        // Validate path using context's path validator or create default
+        let validator = context.path_validator.as_ref()
+            .map(|v| v.clone())
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                // Create default validator with workspace as allowed path
+                let mut validator = PathValidator::new();
+                if let Some(ref workspace) = context.working_directory {
+                    validator = validator.with_workspace(std::path::PathBuf::from(workspace));
+                }
+                validator
+            });
+
+        // Validate path for read access
+        let validated_path = validator.validate_read(path)?;
+
+        // Read file content
+        let mut file = fs::File::open(&validated_path)
+            .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to open file: {}", e)))?;
+
+        let metadata = fs::metadata(&validated_path)
+            .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to read file metadata: {}", e)))?;
+
+        let file_size = metadata.len();
+
+        match encoding {
+            "binary" => {
+                let mut buffer = Vec::with_capacity(file_size as usize);
+                file.read_to_end(&mut buffer)
+                    .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to read file: {}", e)))?;
+
+                // Return base64 encoded binary content
+                use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64};
+                let encoded = BASE64.encode(&buffer);
+
+                Ok(json!({
+                    "content": encoded,
+                    "encoding": "base64",
+                    "size": file_size,
+                    "path": validated_path.to_string_lossy()
+                }))
+            }
+            _ => {
+                // Text mode (utf-8 or ascii)
+                let mut content = String::with_capacity(file_size as usize);
+                file.read_to_string(&mut content)
+                    .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to read file: {}", e)))?;
+
+                Ok(json!({
+                    "content": content,
+                    "encoding": encoding,
+                    "size": file_size,
+                    "path": validated_path.to_string_lossy()
+                }))
+            }
+        }
     }
 }
 
@@ -53,3 +114,38 @@ impl Default for FileReadTool {
         Self::new()
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::io::Write;
+    use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
+    use crate::tool::builtin::PathValidator;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_read_file() {
+        let mut temp_file = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
+        writeln!(temp_file, "Hello, World!").unwrap();
+
+        let path = temp_file.path().to_str().unwrap();
+        let input = json!({ "path": path });
+
+        // Configure PathValidator to allow temp directory (use canonicalized path)
+        let temp_dir = std::env::temp_dir().canonicalize().unwrap_or(std::env::temp_dir());
+        let path_validator = Some(PathValidator::new().with_workspace(temp_dir));
+
+        let context = ToolContext {
+            agent_id: zclaw_types::AgentId::new(),
+            working_directory: None,
+            session_id: None,
+            skill_executor: None,
+            path_validator,
+        };
+
+        let tool = FileReadTool::new();
+        let result = tool.execute(input, &context).await.unwrap();
+
+        assert!(result["content"].as_str().unwrap().contains("Hello, World!"));
+        assert_eq!(result["encoding"].as_str().unwrap(), "utf-8");
+    }
+}

crates/zclaw-runtime/src/tool/builtin/file_write.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
-//! File write tool
+//! File write tool with path validation
 
 use async_trait::async_trait;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use zclaw_types::{Result, ZclawError};
+use std::fs;
+use std::io::Write;
 
 use crate::tool::{Tool, ToolContext};
+use super::path_validator::PathValidator;
 
 pub struct FileWriteTool;
 
@@ -21,7 +24,7 @@ impl Tool for FileWriteTool {
     }
 
     fn description(&self) -> &str {
-        "Write content to a file on the filesystem"
+        "Write content to a file on the filesystem. The file must be within allowed paths."
     }
 
     fn input_schema(&self) -> Value {
@@ -35,22 +38,92 @@ impl Tool for FileWriteTool {
                 "content": {
                     "type": "string",
                     "description": "The content to write to the file"
+                },
+                "mode": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Write mode: 'create' (fail if exists), 'overwrite' (replace), 'append' (add to end)",
+                    "enum": ["create", "overwrite", "append"],
+                    "default": "create"
+                },
+                "encoding": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Content encoding (default: utf-8)",
+                    "enum": ["utf-8", "base64"]
                 }
             },
             "required": ["path", "content"]
         })
     }
 
-    async fn execute(&self, input: Value, _context: &ToolContext) -> Result<Value> {
-        let _path = input["path"].as_str()
+    async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<Value> {
+        let path = input["path"].as_str()
             .ok_or_else(|| ZclawError::InvalidInput("Missing 'path' parameter".into()))?;
+
         let content = input["content"].as_str()
             .ok_or_else(|| ZclawError::InvalidInput("Missing 'content' parameter".into()))?;
 
-        // TODO: Implement actual file writing with path validation
+        let mode = input["mode"].as_str().unwrap_or("create");
+        let encoding = input["encoding"].as_str().unwrap_or("utf-8");
+
+        // Validate path using context's path validator or create default
+        let validator = context.path_validator.as_ref()
+            .map(|v| v.clone())
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                // Create default validator with workspace as allowed path
+                let mut validator = PathValidator::new();
+                if let Some(ref workspace) = context.working_directory {
+                    validator = validator.with_workspace(std::path::PathBuf::from(workspace));
+                }
+                validator
+            });
+
+        // Validate path for write access
+        let validated_path = validator.validate_write(path)?;
+
+        // Decode content based on encoding
+        let bytes = match encoding {
+            "base64" => {
+                use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64};
+                BASE64.decode(content)
+                    .map_err(|e| ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Invalid base64 content: {}", e)))?
+            }
+            _ => content.as_bytes().to_vec()
+        };
+
+        // Check if file exists and handle mode
+        let file_exists = validated_path.exists();
+
+        if file_exists && mode == "create" {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                "File already exists: {}",
+                validated_path.display()
+            )));
+        }
+
+        // Write file
+        let mut file = match mode {
+            "append" => {
+                fs::OpenOptions::new()
+                    .create(true)
+                    .append(true)
+                    .open(&validated_path)
+                    .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to open file for append: {}", e)))?
+            }
+            _ => {
+                // create or overwrite
+                fs::File::create(&validated_path)
+                    .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to create file: {}", e)))?
+            }
+        };
+
+        file.write_all(&bytes)
+            .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to write file: {}", e)))?;
+
         Ok(json!({
             "success": true,
-            "bytes_written": content.len()
+            "bytes_written": bytes.len(),
+            "path": validated_path.to_string_lossy(),
+            "mode": mode
         }))
     }
 }
@@ -60,3 +133,85 @@ impl Default for FileWriteTool {
         Self::new()
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use tempfile::tempdir;
+    use crate::tool::builtin::PathValidator;
+
+    fn create_test_context_with_tempdir(dir: &std::path::Path) -> ToolContext {
+        // Use canonicalized path to handle Windows extended-length paths
+        let workspace = dir.canonicalize().unwrap_or_else(|_| dir.to_path_buf());
+        let path_validator = Some(PathValidator::new().with_workspace(workspace));
+        ToolContext {
+            agent_id: zclaw_types::AgentId::new(),
+            working_directory: None,
+            session_id: None,
+            skill_executor: None,
+            path_validator,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_write_new_file() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("test.txt").to_str().unwrap().to_string();
+
+        let input = json!({
+            "path": path,
+            "content": "Hello, World!"
+        });
+
+        let context = create_test_context_with_tempdir(dir.path());
+
+        let tool = FileWriteTool::new();
+        let result = tool.execute(input, &context).await.unwrap();
+
+        assert!(result["success"].as_bool().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(result["bytes_written"].as_u64().unwrap(), 13);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_create_mode_fails_on_existing() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("existing.txt");
+        fs::write(&path, "existing content").unwrap();
+
+        let input = json!({
+            "path": path.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "content": "new content",
+            "mode": "create"
+        });
+
+        let context = create_test_context_with_tempdir(dir.path());
+
+        let tool = FileWriteTool::new();
+        let result = tool.execute(input, &context).await;
+
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_overwrite_mode() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("test.txt");
+        fs::write(&path, "old content").unwrap();
+
+        let input = json!({
+            "path": path.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "content": "new content",
+            "mode": "overwrite"
+        });
+
+        let context = create_test_context_with_tempdir(dir.path());
+
+        let tool = FileWriteTool::new();
+        let result = tool.execute(input, &context).await.unwrap();
+
+        assert!(result["success"].as_bool().unwrap());
+
+        let content = fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(content, "new content");
+    }
+}

crates/zclaw-runtime/src/tool/builtin/path_validator.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+//! Path validation for file system tools
+//!
+//! Provides security validation for file paths to prevent:
+//! - Path traversal attacks (../)
+//! - Access to blocked system directories
+//! - Access outside allowed workspace directories
+//!
+//! # Security Policy (Default Deny)
+//!
+//! This validator follows a **default deny** security policy:
+//! - If no `allowed_paths` are configured AND no `workspace_root` is set,
+//!   all path access is denied by default
+//! - This prevents accidental exposure of sensitive files when the validator
+//!   is used without proper configuration
+//! - To enable file access, you MUST either:
+//!   1. Set explicit `allowed_paths` in the configuration, OR
+//!   2. Configure a `workspace_root` directory
+//!
+//! Example configuration:
+//! ```ignore
+//! let validator = PathValidator::with_config(config)
+//!     .with_workspace(PathBuf::from("/safe/workspace"));
+//! ```
+
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf, Component};
+use zclaw_types::{Result, ZclawError};
+
+/// Path validator configuration
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct PathValidatorConfig {
+    /// Allowed directory prefixes (empty = allow all within workspace)
+    pub allowed_paths: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// Blocked paths (always denied, even if in allowed_paths)
+    pub blocked_paths: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// Maximum file size in bytes (0 = no limit)
+    pub max_file_size: u64,
+    /// Whether to allow symbolic links
+    pub allow_symlinks: bool,
+}
+
+impl Default for PathValidatorConfig {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            allowed_paths: Vec::new(),
+            blocked_paths: default_blocked_paths(),
+            max_file_size: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB default
+            allow_symlinks: false,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl PathValidatorConfig {
+    /// Create config from security.toml settings
+    pub fn from_config(allowed: &[String], blocked: &[String], max_size: &str) -> Self {
+        let allowed_paths: Vec<PathBuf> = allowed
+            .iter()
+            .map(|p| expand_tilde(p))
+            .collect();
+
+        let blocked_paths: Vec<PathBuf> = blocked
+            .iter()
+            .map(|p| PathBuf::from(p))
+            .chain(default_blocked_paths())
+            .collect();
+
+        let max_file_size = parse_size(max_size).unwrap_or(10 * 1024 * 1024);
+
+        Self {
+            allowed_paths,
+            blocked_paths,
+            max_file_size,
+            allow_symlinks: false,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Default blocked paths for security
+fn default_blocked_paths() -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    vec![
+        // Unix sensitive files
+        PathBuf::from("/etc/shadow"),
+        PathBuf::from("/etc/passwd"),
+        PathBuf::from("/etc/sudoers"),
+        PathBuf::from("/root"),
+        PathBuf::from("/proc"),
+        PathBuf::from("/sys"),
+        // Windows sensitive paths
+        PathBuf::from("C:\\Windows\\System32\\config"),
+        PathBuf::from("C:\\Users\\Administrator"),
+        // SSH keys
+        PathBuf::from("/.ssh"),
+        PathBuf::from("/root/.ssh"),
+        // Environment files
+        PathBuf::from(".env"),
+        PathBuf::from(".env.local"),
+        PathBuf::from(".env.production"),
+    ]
+}
+
+/// Expand tilde in path to home directory
+fn expand_tilde(path: &str) -> PathBuf {
+    if path.starts_with('~') {
+        if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
+            if path == "~" {
+                return home;
+            }
+            if path.starts_with("~/") || path.starts_with("~\\") {
+                return home.join(&path[2..]);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    PathBuf::from(path)
+}
+
+/// Parse size string like "10MB", "1GB", etc.
+fn parse_size(s: &str) -> Option<u64> {
+    let s = s.trim().to_uppercase();
+    let (num, unit) = if s.ends_with("GB") {
+        (s.trim_end_matches("GB").trim(), 1024 * 1024 * 1024)
+    } else if s.ends_with("MB") {
+        (s.trim_end_matches("MB").trim(), 1024 * 1024)
+    } else if s.ends_with("KB") {
+        (s.trim_end_matches("KB").trim(), 1024)
+    } else if s.ends_with("B") {
+        (s.trim_end_matches("B").trim(), 1)
+    } else {
+        (s.as_str(), 1)
+    };
+
+    num.parse::<u64>().ok().map(|n| n * unit)
+}
+
+/// Path validator for file system security
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct PathValidator {
+    config: PathValidatorConfig,
+    workspace_root: Option<PathBuf>,
+}
+
+impl PathValidator {
+    /// Create a new path validator with default config
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            config: PathValidatorConfig::default(),
+            workspace_root: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Create a path validator with custom config
+    pub fn with_config(config: PathValidatorConfig) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            config,
+            workspace_root: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Set the workspace root directory
+    pub fn with_workspace(mut self, workspace: PathBuf) -> Self {
+        self.workspace_root = Some(workspace);
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Validate a path for read access
+    pub fn validate_read(&self, path: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+        let canonical = self.resolve_and_validate(path)?;
+
+        // Check if file exists
+        if !canonical.exists() {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                "File does not exist: {}",
+                path
+            )));
+        }
+
+        // Check if it's a file (not directory)
+        if !canonical.is_file() {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                "Path is not a file: {}",
+                path
+            )));
+        }
+
+        // Check file size
+        if self.config.max_file_size > 0 {
+            if let Ok(metadata) = std::fs::metadata(&canonical) {
+                if metadata.len() > self.config.max_file_size {
+                    return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                        "File too large: {} bytes (max: {} bytes)",
+                        metadata.len(),
+                        self.config.max_file_size
+                    )));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(canonical)
+    }
+
+    /// Validate a path for write access
+    pub fn validate_write(&self, path: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+        let canonical = self.resolve_and_validate(path)?;
+
+        // Check parent directory exists
+        if let Some(parent) = canonical.parent() {
+            if !parent.exists() {
+                return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                    "Parent directory does not exist: {}",
+                    parent.display()
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // If file exists, check it's not blocked
+        if canonical.exists() && !canonical.is_file() {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                "Path exists but is not a file: {}",
+                path
+            )));
+        }
+
+        Ok(canonical)
+    }
+
+    /// Resolve and validate a path
+    fn resolve_and_validate(&self, path: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+        // Expand tilde
+        let expanded = expand_tilde(path);
+        let path_buf = PathBuf::from(&expanded);
+
+        // Check for path traversal
+        self.check_path_traversal(&path_buf)?;
+
+        // Resolve to canonical path
+        let canonical = if path_buf.exists() {
+            path_buf
+                .canonicalize()
+                .map_err(|e| ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Cannot resolve path: {}", e)))?
+        } else {
+            // For non-existent files, resolve parent and join
+            let parent = path_buf.parent().unwrap_or(Path::new("."));
+            let canonical_parent = parent
+                .canonicalize()
+                .map_err(|e| ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Cannot resolve parent path: {}", e)))?;
+            canonical_parent.join(path_buf.file_name().unwrap_or_default())
+        };
+
+        // Check blocked paths
+        self.check_blocked(&canonical)?;
+
+        // Check allowed paths
+        self.check_allowed(&canonical)?;
+
+        // Check symlinks
+        if !self.config.allow_symlinks {
+            self.check_symlink(&canonical)?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(canonical)
+    }
+
+    /// Check for path traversal attacks
+    fn check_path_traversal(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+        for component in path.components() {
+            if let Component::ParentDir = component {
+                // Allow .. if workspace is configured (will be validated in check_allowed)
+                // Deny .. if no workspace is configured (more restrictive)
+                if self.workspace_root.is_none() {
+                    // Without workspace, be more restrictive
+                    return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                        "Path traversal not allowed outside workspace".to_string()
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Check if path is in blocked list
+    fn check_blocked(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+        for blocked in &self.config.blocked_paths {
+            if path.starts_with(blocked) || path == blocked {
+                return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                    "Access to this path is blocked: {}",
+                    path.display()
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Check if path is in allowed list
+    ///
+    /// # Security: Default Deny Policy
+    ///
+    /// This method implements a strict default-deny security policy:
+    /// - If `allowed_paths` is empty AND no `workspace_root` is configured,
+    ///   access is **denied by default** with a clear error message
+    /// - This prevents accidental exposure of the entire filesystem
+    ///   when the validator is misconfigured or used without setup
+    fn check_allowed(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+        // If no allowed paths specified, check workspace
+        if self.config.allowed_paths.is_empty() {
+            if let Some(ref workspace) = self.workspace_root {
+                // Workspace is configured - validate path is within it
+                if !path.starts_with(workspace) {
+                    return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                        "Path outside workspace: {} (workspace: {})",
+                        path.display(),
+                        workspace.display()
+                    )));
+                }
+                return Ok(());
+            } else {
+                // SECURITY: No allowed_paths AND no workspace_root configured
+                // Default to DENY - do not allow unrestricted filesystem access
+                return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                    "Path access denied: no workspace or allowed paths configured. \
+                     To enable file access, configure either 'allowed_paths' in security.toml \
+                     or set a workspace_root directory."
+                        .to_string(),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Check against allowed paths
+        for allowed in &self.config.allowed_paths {
+            if path.starts_with(allowed) {
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+        }
+
+        Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+            "Path not in allowed directories: {}",
+            path.display()
+        )))
+    }
+
+    /// Check for symbolic links
+    fn check_symlink(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+        if path.exists() {
+            let metadata = std::fs::symlink_metadata(path)
+                .map_err(|e| ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Cannot read path metadata: {}", e)))?;
+
+            if metadata.file_type().is_symlink() {
+                return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                    "Symbolic links are not allowed".to_string()
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for PathValidator {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_size() {
+        assert_eq!(parse_size("10MB"), Some(10 * 1024 * 1024));
+        assert_eq!(parse_size("1GB"), Some(1024 * 1024 * 1024));
+        assert_eq!(parse_size("512KB"), Some(512 * 1024));
+        assert_eq!(parse_size("1024B"), Some(1024));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_expand_tilde() {
+        let home = dirs::home_dir().unwrap_or_default();
+        assert_eq!(expand_tilde("~"), home);
+        assert!(expand_tilde("~/test").starts_with(&home));
+        assert_eq!(expand_tilde("/absolute/path"), PathBuf::from("/absolute/path"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_blocked_paths() {
+        let validator = PathValidator::new();
+
+        // These should be blocked (blocked paths take precedence)
+        assert!(validator.resolve_and_validate("/etc/shadow").is_err());
+        assert!(validator.resolve_and_validate("/etc/passwd").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_path_traversal() {
+        // Without workspace, traversal should fail
+        let no_workspace = PathValidator::new();
+        assert!(no_workspace.resolve_and_validate("../../../etc/passwd").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_default_deny_without_configuration() {
+        // SECURITY TEST: Verify default deny policy when no configuration is set
+        // A validator with no allowed_paths and no workspace_root should deny all access
+        let validator = PathValidator::new();
+
+        // Even valid paths should be denied when not configured
+        let result = validator.check_allowed(Path::new("/some/random/path"));
+        assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected denial when no configuration is set");
+
+        let err_msg = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(
+            err_msg.contains("no workspace or allowed paths configured"),
+            "Error message should explain configuration requirement, got: {}",
+            err_msg
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_allows_with_workspace_root() {
+        // When workspace_root is set, paths within workspace should be allowed
+        let workspace = std::env::temp_dir();
+        let validator = PathValidator::new()
+            .with_workspace(workspace.clone());
+
+        // Path within workspace should pass the allowed check
+        let test_path = workspace.join("test_file.txt");
+        let result = validator.check_allowed(&test_path);
+        assert!(result.is_ok(), "Path within workspace should be allowed");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_allows_with_explicit_allowed_paths() {
+        // When allowed_paths is configured, those paths should be allowed
+        let temp_dir = std::env::temp_dir();
+        let config = PathValidatorConfig {
+            allowed_paths: vec![temp_dir.clone()],
+            blocked_paths: vec![],
+            max_file_size: 0,
+            allow_symlinks: false,
+        };
+        let validator = PathValidator::with_config(config);
+
+        // Path within allowed_paths should pass
+        let test_path = temp_dir.join("test_file.txt");
+        let result = validator.check_allowed(&test_path);
+        assert!(result.is_ok(), "Path in allowed_paths should be allowed");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_denies_outside_workspace() {
+        // Paths outside workspace_root should be denied
+        let validator = PathValidator::new()
+            .with_workspace(PathBuf::from("/safe/workspace"));
+
+        let result = validator.check_allowed(Path::new("/other/location"));
+        assert!(result.is_err(), "Path outside workspace should be denied");
+
+        let err_msg = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(
+            err_msg.contains("Path outside workspace"),
+            "Error should indicate path is outside workspace, got: {}",
+            err_msg
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/zclaw-runtime/src/tool/builtin/shell_exec.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,24 @@ use zclaw_types::{Result, ZclawError};
 
 use crate::tool::{Tool, ToolContext};
 
+/// Parse a command string into program and arguments using proper shell quoting
+fn parse_command(command: &str) -> Result<(String, Vec<String>)> {
+    // Use shlex for proper shell-style quoting support
+    let parts = shlex::split(command)
+        .ok_or_else(|| ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+            format!("Failed to parse command: invalid quoting in '{}'", command)
+        ))?;
+
+    if parts.is_empty() {
+        return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput("Empty command".into()));
+    }
+
+    let program = parts[0].clone();
+    let args = parts[1..].to_vec();
+
+    Ok((program, args))
+}
+
 /// Security configuration for shell execution
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
 pub struct ShellSecurityConfig {
@@ -167,18 +185,12 @@ impl Tool for ShellExecTool {
         // Security check
         self.config.is_command_allowed(command)?;
 
-        // Parse command into program and args
-        let parts: Vec<&str> = command.split_whitespace().collect();
-        if parts.is_empty() {
-            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput("Empty command".into()));
-        }
-
-        let program = parts[0];
-        let args = &parts[1..];
+        // Parse command into program and args using proper shell quoting
+        let (program, args) = parse_command(command)?;
 
         // Build command
-        let mut cmd = Command::new(program);
-        cmd.args(args);
+        let mut cmd = Command::new(&program);
+        cmd.args(&args);
 
         if let Some(dir) = cwd {
             cmd.current_dir(dir);
@@ -190,24 +202,35 @@ impl Tool for ShellExecTool {
             .stderr(Stdio::piped());
 
         let start = Instant::now();
+        let timeout_duration = Duration::from_secs(timeout_secs);
 
-        // Execute command
-        let output = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-            cmd.output()
-        })
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Task spawn error: {}", e)))?
-        .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Command execution failed: {}", e)))?;
+        // Execute command with proper timeout (timeout applies DURING execution)
+        let output_result = tokio::time::timeout(
+            timeout_duration,
+            tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
+                cmd.output()
+            })
+        ).await;
+
+        let output = match output_result {
+            // Timeout triggered - command took too long
+            Err(_) => {
+                return Err(ZclawError::Timeout(
+                    format!("Command timed out after {} seconds", timeout_secs)
+                ));
+            }
+            // Spawn blocking task completed
+            Ok(Ok(result)) => {
+                result.map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Command execution failed: {}", e)))?
+            }
+            // Spawn blocking task panicked or was cancelled
+            Ok(Err(e)) => {
+                return Err(ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Task spawn error: {}", e)));
+            }
+        };
 
         let duration = start.elapsed();
 
-        // Check timeout
-        if duration > Duration::from_secs(timeout_secs) {
-            return Err(ZclawError::Timeout(
-                format!("Command timed out after {} seconds", timeout_secs)
-            ));
-        }
-
         // Truncate output if too large
         let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
         let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
@@ -271,4 +294,37 @@ mod tests {
         // Should block non-whitelisted commands
         assert!(config.is_command_allowed("dangerous_command").is_err());
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_command_simple() {
+        let (program, args) = parse_command("ls -la").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(program, "ls");
+        assert_eq!(args, vec!["-la"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_command_with_quotes() {
+        let (program, args) = parse_command("echo \"hello world\"").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(program, "echo");
+        assert_eq!(args, vec!["hello world"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_command_with_single_quotes() {
+        let (program, args) = parse_command("echo 'hello world'").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(program, "echo");
+        assert_eq!(args, vec!["hello world"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_command_complex() {
+        let (program, args) = parse_command("git commit -m \"Initial commit\"").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(program, "git");
+        assert_eq!(args, vec!["commit", "-m", "Initial commit"]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_command_empty() {
+        assert!(parse_command("").is_err());
+    }
 }

crates/zclaw-runtime/src/tool/builtin/web_fetch.rs

@@ -1,16 +1,343 @@
-//! Web fetch tool
+//! Web fetch tool with SSRF protection
+//!
+//! This module provides a secure web fetching capability with comprehensive
+//! SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection including:
+//! - Private IP range blocking (RFC 1918)
+//! - Cloud metadata endpoint blocking (169.254.169.254)
+//! - Localhost/loopback blocking
+//! - Redirect protection with recursive checks
+//! - Timeout control
+//! - Response size limits
 
 use async_trait::async_trait;
+use reqwest::redirect::Policy;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
+use std::time::Duration;
+use url::Url;
 use zclaw_types::{Result, ZclawError};
 
 use crate::tool::{Tool, ToolContext};
 
-pub struct WebFetchTool;
+/// Maximum response size in bytes (10 MB)
+const MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE: u64 = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// Request timeout in seconds
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 30;
+
+/// Maximum number of redirect hops allowed
+const MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS: usize = 5;
+
+/// Maximum URL length
+const MAX_URL_LENGTH: usize = 2048;
+
+pub struct WebFetchTool {
+    client: reqwest::Client,
+}
 
 impl WebFetchTool {
     pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Self
+        // Build a client with redirect policy that we control
+        // We'll handle redirects manually to validate each target
+        let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(Duration::from_secs(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECS))
+            .redirect(Policy::none()) // Handle redirects manually for SSRF validation
+            .user_agent("ZCLAW/1.0")
+            .build()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| reqwest::Client::new());
+
+        Self { client }
+    }
+
+    /// Validate a URL for SSRF safety
+    ///
+    /// This checks:
+    /// - URL scheme (only http/https allowed)
+    /// - Private IP ranges (RFC 1918)
+    /// - Loopback addresses
+    /// - Cloud metadata endpoints
+    /// - Link-local addresses
+    fn validate_url(&self, url_str: &str) -> Result<Url> {
+        // Check URL length
+        if url_str.len() > MAX_URL_LENGTH {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                "URL exceeds maximum length of {} characters",
+                MAX_URL_LENGTH
+            )));
+        }
+
+        // Parse URL
+        let url = Url::parse(url_str)
+            .map_err(|e| ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Invalid URL: {}", e)))?;
+
+        // Check scheme - only allow http and https
+        match url.scheme() {
+            "http" | "https" => {}
+            scheme => {
+                return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                    "URL scheme '{}' is not allowed. Only http and https are permitted.",
+                    scheme
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Extract host - for IPv6, url.host_str() returns the address without brackets
+        // But url::Url also provides host() which gives us the parsed Host type
+        let host = url
+            .host_str()
+            .ok_or_else(|| ZclawError::InvalidInput("URL must have a host".into()))?;
+
+        // Check if host is an IP address or domain
+        // For IPv6 in URLs, host_str returns the address with brackets, e.g., "[::1]"
+        // We need to strip the brackets for parsing
+        let host_for_parsing = if host.starts_with('[') && host.ends_with(']') {
+            &host[1..host.len()-1]
+        } else {
+            host
+        };
+
+        if let Ok(ip) = host_for_parsing.parse::<IpAddr>() {
+            self.validate_ip_address(&ip)?;
+        } else {
+            // For domain names, we need to resolve and check the IP
+            // This is handled during the actual request, but we do basic checks here
+            self.validate_hostname(host)?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(url)
+    }
+
+    /// Validate an IP address for SSRF safety
+    fn validate_ip_address(&self, ip: &IpAddr) -> Result<()> {
+        match ip {
+            IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => self.validate_ipv4(ipv4)?,
+            IpAddr::V6(ipv6) => self.validate_ipv6(ipv6)?,
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Validate IPv4 address
+    fn validate_ipv4(&self, ip: &Ipv4Addr) -> Result<()> {
+        let octets = ip.octets();
+
+        // Block loopback (127.0.0.0/8)
+        if octets[0] == 127 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to loopback addresses (127.x.x.x) is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block private ranges (RFC 1918)
+        // 10.0.0.0/8
+        if octets[0] == 10 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to private IP range 10.x.x.x is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // 172.16.0.0/12 (172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255)
+        if octets[0] == 172 && (16..=31).contains(&octets[1]) {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to private IP range 172.16-31.x.x is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // 192.168.0.0/16
+        if octets[0] == 192 && octets[1] == 168 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to private IP range 192.168.x.x is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254)
+        if octets[0] == 169 && octets[1] == 254 && octets[2] == 169 && octets[3] == 254 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16)
+        if octets[0] == 169 && octets[1] == 254 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to link-local addresses (169.254.x.x) is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block 0.0.0.0/8 (current network)
+        if octets[0] == 0 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to 0.x.x.x addresses is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block broadcast address
+        if *ip == Ipv4Addr::new(255, 255, 255, 255) {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to broadcast address is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block multicast addresses (224.0.0.0/4)
+        if (224..=239).contains(&octets[0]) {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to multicast addresses is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Validate IPv6 address
+    fn validate_ipv6(&self, ip: &Ipv6Addr) -> Result<()> {
+        // Block loopback (::1)
+        if *ip == Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to IPv6 loopback address (::1) is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block unspecified address (::)
+        if *ip == Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to unspecified IPv6 address (::) is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:0:0/96)
+        // These could bypass IPv4 checks
+        if ip.to_string().starts_with("::ffff:") {
+            // Extract the embedded IPv4 and validate it
+            let segments = ip.segments();
+            // IPv4-mapped format: 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:xxxx:xxxx
+            if segments[5] == 0xffff {
+                let v4_addr = ((segments[6] as u32) << 16) | (segments[7] as u32);
+                let ipv4 = Ipv4Addr::from(v4_addr);
+                self.validate_ipv4(&ipv4)?;
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Block link-local IPv6 (fe80::/10)
+        let segments = ip.segments();
+        if (segments[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to IPv6 link-local addresses is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // Block unique local addresses (fc00::/7) - IPv6 equivalent of private ranges
+        if (segments[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00 {
+            return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(
+                "Access to IPv6 unique local addresses is not allowed".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Validate a hostname for potential SSRF attacks
+    fn validate_hostname(&self, host: &str) -> Result<()> {
+        let host_lower = host.to_lowercase();
+
+        // Block localhost variants
+        let blocked_hosts = [
+            "localhost",
+            "localhost.localdomain",
+            "ip6-localhost",
+            "ip6-loopback",
+            "metadata.google.internal",
+            "metadata",
+            "kubernetes.default",
+            "kubernetes.default.svc",
+        ];
+
+        for blocked in &blocked_hosts {
+            if host_lower == *blocked || host_lower.ends_with(&format!(".{}", blocked)) {
+                return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                    "Access to '{}' is not allowed",
+                    host
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Block hostnames that look like IP addresses (decimal, octal, hex encoding)
+        // These could be used to bypass IP checks
+        self.check_hostname_ip_bypass(&host_lower)?;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Check for hostname-based IP bypass attempts
+    fn check_hostname_ip_bypass(&self, host: &str) -> Result<()> {
+        // Check for decimal IP encoding (e.g., 2130706433 = 127.0.0.1)
+        if host.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()) {
+            if let Ok(num) = host.parse::<u32>() {
+                let ip = Ipv4Addr::from(num);
+                self.validate_ipv4(&ip)?;
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Check for domains that might resolve to private IPs
+        // This is not exhaustive but catches common patterns
+        // The actual DNS resolution check happens during the request
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Follow redirects with SSRF validation
+    async fn follow_redirects_safe(&self, url: Url, max_hops: usize) -> Result<(Url, reqwest::Response)> {
+        let mut current_url = url;
+        let mut hops = 0;
+
+        loop {
+            // Validate the current URL
+            current_url = self.validate_url(current_url.as_str())?;
+
+            // Make the request
+            let response = self
+                .client
+                .get(current_url.clone())
+                .send()
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Request failed: {}", e)))?;
+
+            // Check if it's a redirect
+            let status = response.status();
+            if status.is_redirection() {
+                hops += 1;
+                if hops > max_hops {
+                    return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                        "Too many redirects (max {})",
+                        max_hops
+                    )));
+                }
+
+                // Get the redirect location
+                let location = response
+                    .headers()
+                    .get(reqwest::header::LOCATION)
+                    .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
+                    .ok_or_else(|| {
+                        ZclawError::ToolError("Redirect without Location header".into())
+                    })?;
+
+                // Resolve the location against the current URL
+                let new_url = current_url.join(location).map_err(|e| {
+                    ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Invalid redirect location: {}", e))
+                })?;
+
+                tracing::debug!(
+                    "Following redirect {} -> {}",
+                    current_url.as_str(),
+                    new_url.as_str()
+                );
+
+                current_url = new_url;
+                // Continue loop to validate and follow
+            } else {
+                // Not a redirect, return the response
+                return Ok((current_url, response));
+            }
+        }
     }
 }
 
@@ -21,7 +348,7 @@ impl Tool for WebFetchTool {
     }
 
     fn description(&self) -> &str {
-        "Fetch content from a URL"
+        "Fetch content from a URL with SSRF protection"
     }
 
     fn input_schema(&self) -> Value {
@@ -30,12 +357,29 @@ impl Tool for WebFetchTool {
             "properties": {
                 "url": {
                     "type": "string",
-                    "description": "The URL to fetch"
+                    "description": "The URL to fetch (must be http or https)"
                 },
                 "method": {
                     "type": "string",
                     "enum": ["GET", "POST"],
                     "description": "HTTP method (default: GET)"
+                },
+                "headers": {
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "description": "Optional HTTP headers (key-value pairs)",
+                    "additionalProperties": {
+                        "type": "string"
+                    }
+                },
+                "body": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Request body for POST requests"
+                },
+                "timeout": {
+                    "type": "integer",
+                    "description": "Timeout in seconds (default: 30, max: 60)",
+                    "minimum": 1,
+                    "maximum": 60
                 }
             },
             "required": ["url"]
@@ -43,13 +387,167 @@ impl Tool for WebFetchTool {
     }
 
     async fn execute(&self, input: Value, _context: &ToolContext) -> Result<Value> {
-        let url = input["url"].as_str()
+        let url_str = input["url"]
+            .as_str()
             .ok_or_else(|| ZclawError::InvalidInput("Missing 'url' parameter".into()))?;
 
-        // TODO: Implement actual web fetching with SSRF protection
+        let method = input["method"].as_str().unwrap_or("GET").to_uppercase();
+        let timeout_secs = input["timeout"].as_u64().unwrap_or(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECS).min(60);
+
+        // Validate URL for SSRF
+        let url = self.validate_url(url_str)?;
+
+        tracing::info!("WebFetch: Fetching {} with method {}", url.as_str(), method);
+
+        // Build request with validated URL
+        let mut request_builder = match method.as_str() {
+            "GET" => self.client.get(url.clone()),
+            "POST" => {
+                let mut builder = self.client.post(url.clone());
+                if let Some(body) = input["body"].as_str() {
+                    builder = builder.body(body.to_string());
+                }
+                builder
+            }
+            _ => {
+                return Err(ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!(
+                    "Unsupported HTTP method: {}",
+                    method
+                )));
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Add custom headers if provided
+        if let Some(headers) = input["headers"].as_object() {
+            for (key, value) in headers {
+                if let Some(value_str) = value.as_str() {
+                    // Block dangerous headers
+                    let key_lower = key.to_lowercase();
+                    if key_lower == "host" {
+                        continue; // Don't allow overriding host
+                    }
+                    if key_lower.starts_with("x-forwarded") {
+                        continue; // Block proxy header injection
+                    }
+
+                    let header_name = reqwest::header::HeaderName::try_from(key.as_str())
+                        .map_err(|e| {
+                            ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Invalid header name '{}': {}", key, e))
+                        })?;
+                    let header_value = reqwest::header::HeaderValue::from_str(value_str)
+                        .map_err(|e| {
+                            ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Invalid header value: {}", e))
+                        })?;
+                    request_builder = request_builder.header(header_name, header_value);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Set timeout
+        let request_builder = request_builder.timeout(Duration::from_secs(timeout_secs));
+
+        // Execute with redirect handling
+        let response = request_builder
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                let error_msg = e.to_string();
+
+                // Provide user-friendly error messages
+                if error_msg.contains("dns") || error_msg.contains("resolve") {
+                    ZclawError::ToolError(format!(
+                        "Failed to resolve hostname: {}. Please check the URL.",
+                        url.host_str().unwrap_or("unknown")
+                    ))
+                } else if error_msg.contains("timeout") {
+                    ZclawError::ToolError(format!(
+                        "Request timed out after {} seconds",
+                        timeout_secs
+                    ))
+                } else if error_msg.contains("connection refused") {
+                    ZclawError::ToolError(
+                        "Connection refused. The server may be down or unreachable.".into(),
+                    )
+                } else {
+                    ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Request failed: {}", error_msg))
+                }
+            })?;
+
+        // Handle redirects manually with SSRF validation
+        let (final_url, response) = if response.status().is_redirection() {
+            // Start redirect following process
+            let location = response
+                .headers()
+                .get(reqwest::header::LOCATION)
+                .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
+                .ok_or_else(|| {
+                    ZclawError::ToolError("Redirect without Location header".into())
+                })?;
+
+            let redirect_url = url.join(location).map_err(|e| {
+                ZclawError::InvalidInput(format!("Invalid redirect location: {}", e))
+            })?;
+
+            self.follow_redirects_safe(redirect_url, MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS).await?
+        } else {
+            (url, response)
+        };
+
+        // Check response status
+        let status = response.status();
+        let status_code = status.as_u16();
+
+        // Check content length before reading body
+        if let Some(content_length) = response.content_length() {
+            if content_length > MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE {
+                return Err(ZclawError::ToolError(format!(
+                    "Response too large: {} bytes (max: {} bytes)",
+                    content_length, MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Get content type BEFORE consuming response with bytes()
+        let content_type = response
+            .headers()
+            .get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
+            .and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
+            .unwrap_or("text/plain")
+            .to_string();
+
+        // Read response body with size limit
+        let bytes = response.bytes().await.map_err(|e| {
+            ZclawError::ToolError(format!("Failed to read response body: {}", e))
+        })?;
+
+        // Double-check size after reading
+        if bytes.len() as u64 > MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE {
+            return Err(ZclawError::ToolError(format!(
+                "Response too large: {} bytes (max: {} bytes)",
+                bytes.len(),
+                MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE
+            )));
+        }
+
+        // Try to decode as UTF-8, fall back to base64 for binary
+        let content = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+            use base64::Engine;
+            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&bytes)
+        });
+
+        tracing::info!(
+            "WebFetch: Successfully fetched {} bytes from {} (status: {})",
+            content.len(),
+            final_url.as_str(),
+            status_code
+        );
+
         Ok(json!({
-            "status": 200,
-            "content": format!("Fetched content placeholder for: {}", url)
+            "status": status_code,
+            "url": final_url.as_str(),
+            "content_type": content_type,
+            "content": content,
+            "size": content.len()
         }))
     }
 }
@@ -59,3 +557,91 @@ impl Default for WebFetchTool {
         Self::new()
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_localhost() {
+        let tool = WebFetchTool::new();
+
+        // Test localhost
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://localhost/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://127.0.0.1/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://127.0.0.2/test").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_private_ips() {
+        let tool = WebFetchTool::new();
+
+        // Test 10.x.x.x
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://10.0.0.1/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://10.255.255.255/test").is_err());
+
+        // Test 172.16-31.x.x
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://172.16.0.1/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://172.31.255.255/test").is_err());
+        // 172.15.x.x should be allowed
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://172.15.0.1/test").is_ok());
+
+        // Test 192.168.x.x
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://192.168.0.1/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://192.168.255.255/test").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_cloud_metadata() {
+        let tool = WebFetchTool::new();
+
+        // Test cloud metadata endpoint
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://169.254.169.254/metadata").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_ipv6() {
+        let tool = WebFetchTool::new();
+
+        // Test IPv6 loopback
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://[::1]/test").is_err());
+
+        // Test IPv6 unspecified
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://[::]/test").is_err());
+
+        // Test IPv4-mapped loopback
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/test").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_scheme() {
+        let tool = WebFetchTool::new();
+
+        // Only http and https allowed
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("ftp://example.com/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("file:///etc/passwd").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("javascript:alert(1)").is_err());
+
+        // http and https should be allowed (URL parsing succeeds)
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://example.com/test").is_ok());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("https://example.com/test").is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_blocked_hostnames() {
+        let tool = WebFetchTool::new();
+
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://localhost/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://metadata.google.internal/test").is_err());
+        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://kubernetes.default/test").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_url_length() {
+        let tool = WebFetchTool::new();
+
+        // Create a URL that's too long
+        let long_url = format!("http://example.com/{}", "a".repeat(3000));
+        assert!(tool.validate_url(&long_url).is_err());
+    }
+}